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In most countries, governments intervene in the process of R&D by financing 
a substantial part of it. The mechanism employed for choosing the projects to be 
financed is a committee composed of experts who evaluate projects in their field of 
specialization, and decide which ones should be funded. This mechanism for 
evaluating projects is conservative. Proposals of new ideas are too often rejected, 
and inventions are commonly thrown out of the set of potential projects.  
In this paper, I propose a mechanism that will allow less conformity: focal 
randomization. Focal randomization mechanism (FRM) states that projects which 
are unanimously ranked at the top by all reviewers, will be adopted. Projects 
perceived as valueless by all are rejected, while projects that are ranked differently 
will be randomized. I compare the average return under the present and proposed 
mechanism. I examine under which conditions this new mechanism is preferable, 
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In most countries, governments intervene in the process of R&D by financing a 
substantial part of it. The reason for this intervention is that research and development 
undertaken by one firm has positive spillover effects on the entire economy. Since 
firms do not take these spillover effects into account, they invest in R&D less than the 
optimal amount. It is difficult to estimate these externalities, but it could double the real 
rate of return. Moreover basic research is a non-excludable investment and firms have 
no interest in undertaking it in a competitive market. Therefore, government financing 
is necessary. In some countries, it can amount to more than 60% of total R&D.   
Such an intervention, however, creates its own problem: How does the government 
choose which projects to finance? It could be that the projects chosen are not those with 
the highest potential growth for the economy and therefore not optimal for the country. 
In this paper, we discuss the mechanism of evaluating and choosing the projects to 
be financed in a given field, but do not treat the problem of deciding which field to 
finance. The mechanism employed in most countries is a committee composed of 
research fellows who evaluate projects in their field of specialization, and decide which 
ones should be funded. Alternatively, the decision is left to the committee chair taking 
into consideration the referee's reports. Both mechanisms are based on what is termed 
"peer review". 
The problems with peer review have been analyzed in length, and in the next 
section, we give an apercu of the different problems. The consequences of making 
mistakes in funding research are more severe than with publishing articles, since in the 
latter, a good work might be known although later. However if great research was not 
funded, it will not come through.  
However, most of these negative effects are not affecting the rate of growth of the 
economy as do one specific problem: the conservative bias. Peer review presents a bias 
against innovative applications: "A common informal view is that it is easier to obtain 
funds for conventional projects. Those who are eager to get funding are not likely to 
propose radical or unorthodox projects. Since you don't know who the referees are 
going to be, it is best to assume that they are middle-of the road. Therefore, a middle of 
the road application is safer" (Martin, 1997, p.3). 
The best way to analyze the issue of conservative picking of projects is by using 
the typology of Arrow who divides new technologies between inventions and 
innovations; innovations being new applications of an already known technology,   2
while innovations are completely new technologies on which it is impossible to foresee 
their economic consequences.  For projects that are in the category of innovations, it is 
not difficult for specialists in the field to evaluate them, and therefore the mechanism 
designed for evaluating innovations is adequate. However, projects entering the 
category of inventions (a new technology with unforeseen applications) cannot be 
evaluated properly and may therefore be rejected. Thus the method employed leads to 
the rejection of inventions. 
The errors in estimating the value of these inventive projects can be very 
substantial. Some examples, from the past, highlight these errors of estimation. For 
instance, 50 years ago, the CEO of IBM claimed: "I think that the world market for 
computers is for no more than five computers".  Eighty years ago, the commander of 
the Allied Forces during World War I said: "Planes are a nice toy but with no military 
value". One of the worst estimation on an invention was written by the CEO of Western 
Union in 1876 when deciding which project to finance: "The telephone has too many 
problems to be taken seriously as a telecommunication tool. No value for our firm".  
The mechanism used nowadays for evaluating projects is conservative, and new 
ideas might be less accepted than they should be. Inventions are commonly thrown out 
of the set of potential projects. As a consequence, the government chooses investments 
with lower return; invention projects are riskier on average but yield higher return. 
In this paper, I propose a mechanism that will allow less conformity; it will lead to 
accept some projects with a high potential, without accepting projects that for sure have 
no future. The mechanism I propose is a "focal randomization". When referees have a 
good understanding of the value of certain projects, their report will be final. On 
projects that appear to be inventive, and which referees cannot evaluate, we propose 
that projects will be chosen randomly. This paper examines under which conditions this 
mechanism is preferable. 
We present three models that differ in their assumption about the information set 
of the referees. In the first section, the model assumes almost perfect information, while 
in the model of the third section, referees have almost no efficient way for evaluating 
projects. It is clear that in reality, the third model is the one prevailing. Our policy 
recommendations, presented in the conclusion are based on this last model.   
 
II. The literature 
The literature on evaluation can be divided into two main categories: research on 
the effects of ex-ante evaluation and research on ex-post evaluation. The ex-ante 
evaluation is related to choosing research to be funded, or papers to be published. The 
ex-post evaluation literature focuses on how to evaluate the impact of the research 
funded.     3
This paper focuses only on ex-ante evaluation, and it should be noted that most of 
the literature on evaluation is in fact analyzing evaluation ex-post, i.e., how can we 
determine the results and effects of a particular research.
1 This literature is divided in 
two main channels: scientific and experimental models vs. management-oriented 
systems models.   
Lately, Jaffee (2002) has proposed some new designs for ex-post evaluation: a 
regression-discontinuity design. His proposal is based on the fact that all projects can 
be divided into two groups: the projects that have been funded, and those that were not. 
In consequence, one can check if there is a significant difference between these groups.  
This will allow examining if funding has an effect on research.   
This paper is about ex-ante evaluation. How do you value proposals and which 
one, do you want to fund. Peer review today is the most common mechanism for 
evaluative testing of R&D projects or research. Most of the main funding agencies 
believe that expert review is the most effective mechanism for evaluating the quality, 
leadership, and relevance of research (especially basic research) performed and funded 
by them. Ultimately, decisions regarding the selection and funding of research 
programs must be made by agency managers informed by expert review. So, the peer 
review is used in almost each country to distribute public funds from research: the EU, 
the US and the RAE in the UK. 
For instance NAS (1999) assesses: "Federal agencies should use expert review to 
assess the quality of research they support, the relevance of that research to their 
mission, and the leadership of the research. Expert review must strive for balance 
between having the most knowledgeable and the most independent individuals serve as 
members. Each agency should develop clear, explicit guidance with regard to 
structuring and employing expert review processes. The most effective way to evaluate 
research programs is by expert review. The most commonly used form of expert review 
of quality is peer review".   
Despite the wide use of this way of picking projects to be funded, there is some 
criticism on this mechanism.  Peer review leads to many biases (see Smith, 1994).  
The first one is called the confirmatory bias, which has been analyzed by Mahoney 
(1977). Scholars have a tendency to reject research that will show results against their 
own theoretical perspective. There is a clear bias for scholars to accept research that 
support or confirm their beliefs. Moreover, there are some proofs of a lack of 
impartiality, vested interests, or rivalry (see Martin, 1997).   
Peer review tends to present also an institution bias --reviewers favor submissions 
from prestigious institutions (see Godlee et al., 1998). Prestige of the person or 
institution affiliation affects the reviewer recommendation. Peters and Ceci (1982) have 
                                                           
1 A broad coverage of ex-post evaluation can be found in Fahrenkrog et al., 2002.   4
shown that names and affiliations affect acceptance: they have resubmitted papers that 
had already been published after changing the names and affiliations of authors. Their 
results confirm a bias related to reputations of colleagues, and institutions. 
There is also a gender bias. A Swedish study found clear evidence of 
discrimination against women in the awarding of research grants (see Wenneras and 
Wold, 1997). There is also a "positive" bias. It seems that referee tend to prefer positive 
than negative results. Already Bacon (1621) wrote: "the human intellect .. is more 
moved and excited by affirmative than by negatives." 
The bias, I intend to examine in this paper is the "conservative bias". It is a bias 
against innovative ideas, and inventions Horrobin (1990) has suggested that peer 
review is a conservative process. It encourages the research in known field, and makes 
it difficult for multidisciplinary work. It looks for safe research so that innovative and 
risky and unconventional ideas will not be funded. 
This paper will propose a mechanism based on peer review that will cure the 
problem of conservative bias. It will also permit to weed out other wrong doings with 
peer review. Lately, there are proofs of misconducts with peer review: the most 
important are failure to check proper data and plagiarism. The NSF conducted an 
inquiry into plagiarism. They found cases in which researchers who were asked to peer 
review a proposal for research turned it down, and proposed it to another grant; the 
methodology has been copied word by word! In the UK, detecting fraud has become 
the aim of the committee on publication ethics (cope). 
I will show in this paper that "focal randomization mechanism" (FRM) can permit 
to reduce the bias against innovations, and can also reduce the effects of wrong doing 
of peer-review.  
  
III. A Framework for Focal Randomization Mechanism (FRM) 
1. The First Model: Homogeneity of reviewers. 
Our first model assumes that all reviewers are similar, and they all take the time that 
is needed to evaluate well the different projects. 
A. Assumptions 
i. We have k projects, from which only h can be funded. 
ii. Projects are divided in two groups: innovations and inventions. Innovations are 
technologies based on an already known technology. A referee that is specialized in 
this field is capable, if he spends some time, of analyzing the different projects and 
evaluating them correctly.  
Inventions are projects presenting a new technique and with unforeseen knowledge 
as to its future value. We assume in this first model that referees are capable of making 
the distinction between innovations and inventions, even if they cannot evaluate the   5
invention projects. In this model we also assume that all referees make the same 
decision about inventions and innovations, since they are all alike. There are ko 
innovation projects, and kv invention projects (ko + kv = k). 
 
B. The model 
Let us define: 
 
  Voi    The true value of the i innovation project, i=1...ko 
  Vvi     The true value of the i invention project, i=1...kv 
  Uoi      The value given by the referees of the i innovation  project 
  Uvi      The value given by the referees of the i invention project 
 
We order the projects in an increasing value such that 
  Vo1  <  Voi ... < Voko  .  
  Vv1  <  Vvi ... < Vvkv  .  
 
The value of an innovation project, Voi, is based on two parameters. The first is its 
originality compared to the  technology already known, that we define as Di  (for 
distance from the known technology), where Di ∈ [0,15], and the longer the distance 
from the known technology, the higher the value.   
The second element is the cleverness of the  project, Bi (for brightness); Bi ∈ 
[0,200]. The more clever a project, given its Di, the higher the value. Therefore we 
have: 
 
   Voi  = αDi + γB i         ( 1 )  
 
We assume in this first model that the referees identify, without error, the value of 
the innovation. We have, therefore, that: 
 
    Uoi  = αDi + γB i            ( 2 )  
 
 An invention has a third element which is the inventive part of the technology, λi.  
Therefore: 
 
 Vvi  =  αDi + γBi  + βλi            ( 3 )  
 
Referees cannot recognize the true value of an invention, λi, and they all give the 
value λ*.    6
 
 Uvi  =  αDi + γBi  + βλ*                (4) 
 
Moreover, we assume that since referees have difficulty in recognizing the future 
value of inventions, they tend to underestimate it, and give to λ* a lower value than the 
average of λi.  
 
C. The mechanism for choosing optimal projects.  
In order to present the mechanism of "focal randomization" in a clear and vivid 
way, we will use a numerical example.   
We assume that four projects have to be chosen out of ten (k=10, and h=4). There 
are seven innovations, and three  inventions (this is in the information set of the 
referees). The value given by the referee to these inventions is low. Therefore in the 
present mechanism, none of the inventions will be chosen.  
We set: α =10,  γ =1, and the Dis and Bis are: 
   [4,5,7,8,12,3,9],  [0,30,70,65,50,160,110] 
 
Therefore Vois and Uois are: 
   [40,80,140,145,170,190,200] 
For the inventions we set α =10; γ =1; β=1; λ*=20 and the Dis, Bis and λi s are: 
    [6,5,1]; [0,0,0]; [30,80,300] 
Therefore Vvis and Uvis are respectively: 
[90,130,310]; [80,70,30] 
 
Given these data, we show in the first row of table 1, the optimal choice from the 
point of view of the country. The invention (the tenth project) and innovations number 
5, 6 ,7 should be funded.  
Under the present system, and under our assumptions that innovations are well 
ranked, we get that the invention (#10) is not going to be funded, and therefore the 
value for the country is lower.
2   
Our "focal randomization" mechanism in this simple model states: "All projects 
that are inventions are pooled, and in a random way, we pick one of them. About 
innovations projects, we take the best of them".  
                                                           
2 In this presentation, we do not discuss risk. It seems quite obvious that inventions have higher risk. 
However, in reality, scholars, who rank the projects, present their result mainly by discussing the 




  Optimal choice    The present system     Randomization 
1  #10  310      #7  200        1/3(#8+#9+#10)   177 
2  #7  200    #6  190    #7      200 
3  #6  190    #5  170    #6   190 
4  #5  170    #4  145    #5   170 
 
Total       870            705              737 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
From this example, we see that focal randomization allows a greater return to 
government financing because under the present process, all inventions would have 
been rejected. 
It is clear that countries in which the government is very risk averse, this 
mechanism should not be adopted. If, for some reasons, the country prefers a lower 
growth in the near future to a much higher growth in the far future, it should not invest 
in inventions.  This would be the case if the country runs a big current account deficit 
and cannot easily borrow abroad. However, if the country can borrow overseas, and has 
no credit rationing, then it should invest in inventions in order to increase the growth 
rate in the long run. For developed countries, governments have to finance the projects 
which display high risk, since the private market will invest in low risk projects with 
high returns. So if the government does not fund the "inventions", it looses some of its 
goal. 
We note also that if there were perfect correlation  between Dis and λis, 
randomization would not be needed and  invention with the higher Dis would be 
chosen. It would still be necessary to separate the process of choice for innovations and 
inventions.  
This model has assumed that referees have perfect information about the value of 
innovations. In the next model, we present a more realistic model. 
 
2. Second model: Heterogeneity of reviewers. 
In this section, we waive the assumption that referees have perfect knowledge on 
the value of an innovation, as  well as the assumption that referees are all alike. 
Sometimes, some of the reviewers do not invest enough time in order to perfectly 
understand the import of the project. It is widely known that: "We are concerned that 
the standard of the reports that we receive from our peer reviewers is not always very   8
high. Many of the men and women whom we ask to review for us are busy people. 
Perhaps they don't have the timer or motivation to do the job as well as they should".  
In consequence, we assume that time spent on reviewing affects the quality of the 




i. We have k projects, from which only h can be funded. 
ii. Projects are divided in two groups: innovations and inventions. As opposed to 
the first model, a referee is not always capable of evaluating correctly innovations. The 
more time he spends, investigating the project, the better proxy he gets to the project 
value. 
 
B. The model 
As in the first model, we have: 
Voi     The true value of the i innovation project,  
Uoij  The value given by referee j to the i project 
  
The definition of Voi is identical to the first model: 
 
 Voi  =  αDi + γBi                         (1) 
  
In the previous model, the referees evaluate Di and Bi without error. We now 
assume that the cleverness part, Bi, can be evaluated with no error: all referees can say 
if a project is clever or not. However, the distance (the novelty) from the technology 
already known, Di, is not easily evaluated as in the previous model.  We define Tj as 
the time that referee j takes to investigate an innovation, and assume that if the time 
invested is higher that the  innovation distance, i.e., Di ≤ Tj, then the referee can 
correctly estimate the true value of the innovation. However, if   Di > Tj, then he does 
not understand the true value. We assume that the more time a referee spends analyzing 
the project, the closer he gets to the true value  Di; and the greater the difference 
between Di and Tj, the larger the error in valuation. The specific form chosen, for sake 
of simplicity is: 
  
       αDi + γBi     for Di ≤ Tj          (5)  
  Uoij  =    
    αTj  + γBi      for Di  > Tj 
   9
The difference, ∆ij ,  between the true value, and the estimation is therefore: 
 
         0      for  Di    ≤  Tj    (6) 
  ∆ij  =    
    α( Di - Tj)             for Di  > Tj 
 
The error of estimation is zero if the time invested by the referee is greater than Di, 
and is a positive function of the difference between the innovative value of the project 
and the time given by the referee, Di - Tj. 
How is the referee choosing the amount of time he spends on each project? On one 
hand, he wants to take the least time possible, k.Tj, since he could use this time for 
alternative tasks. It is assumed that every referee has his own subjective value to time, 
sj. On the other hand, the referee does not want to make too large an error about the 
true value of the project, since he is concerned that the best projects will be chosen. 
Therefore, the loss function he wants to minimize is:   
 
L = Min  (∆j) 
2 + sj (k.Tj)
 2        ( 7 )  
when  ∆j  = ∑ ∆ij   i.e.,  the sum of the errors he makes. 
 
The optimal Tj for each referee is the argmin of function L. It is found by taking 
the FOC of equation L. Thus, referees with high subjective  value of time, will 
relatively prefer to spend less time Tj on each project, and for all project such that  Di  
> Tj their error  will relatively be greater. The optimal Tj for each referee is denoted  
Tj*. 
  Concerning inventions, we assume the same function as in the previous section: 
 
 Vvi  =  αDi + γBi  + βλi             ( 3 )  
 Uvi  =  αDi + γBi  + βλ*                 ( 4 )  
 
C. The mechanism for choosing optimal projects.  
We show that the optimal way to rank  projects under these assumptions is to 
accept the projects that all referees have ranked at the top, and to reject all the projects 
that all referees have put at the bottom. For projects on which referees do not agree on 
the ranking, randomization is optimal. We term this mechanism: "focal randomization", 
since randomization is performed only on a subset of projects.  
We show, in a numerical example, which reports will be chosen, and compare the 
mechanism presently used with the one proposed. As in the previous case, we present 
the focal randomization using the same basic example as before, although five projects   10
will be funded. So we assume k=10, and h=5. We have seven innovations, and three 
inventions, as in the previous case.  
We set: α =10,  γ =1, and the Dis and Bis are: 
   [4,5,7,8,12,3,9],  [0,30,70,65,50,160,110] 
 
For the inventions we set α =10; γ =1; β=1; λ*=20 and the Dis, Bis and λi s are: 
    [6,5,1]; [0,0,0]; [30,80,300] 
 
Therefore the Vis of innovations and inventions are as in the previous case: 
1       2     3     4     5     6    7               8     9     10 
[40,80,140,145, 170,190, 200,           90, 130, 310] 
 
About the valuation of the peer review, let us assume that we have three referees 
with sj such that the optimal time spent for reviewing the projects are 4, 5, and 9 
respectively. Therefore from equation (5), Uoij  j=1,2,3 are : 
 
 Uoi1= [40, 70, 110, 105,  90, 190, 150];  the ranking is: 6, 7, 3, 4.  
 Uoi2= [40, 80, 120, 115, 100,190, 160];  the ranking is: 6, 7, 3, 4. 
 Uoi3= [40, 80, 140, 145, 140,190, 200];  the ranking is: 7, 6, 4, 5. 
 
 and in average we get: 
 Uoi =  [ 40, 77, 123,  122, 110, 190, 170];               (8) 
 
 In table 2, we present the different options under the different mechanism. In the 
first row of table 1, we present the optimal choice from the point of view of the 
country. We focus only on innovations and projects # 4, 5, 6 ,7 should be funded.  
Under the present system, it is equation (8) which leads to the choice of the 
projects, and as shown in table 2, the projects funded are: 3, 4, 6, 7. 
Our "focal randomization" mechanism in this simple model states: "All projects 
that are ranked in a consistent way at the top by all reviewers, will be adopted. Projects 
that are ranked differently will be randomized". 
In our example, 7 and 6 and 4 are adopted by all reviewers. On 3 and 5, we will 
randomize. The results are presented in the last column of table 2.   11
Table 2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
  Optimal choice    The present system     Randomization 
1  #7  200    #6  190   #7        200 
2  #6  190    #7  200   #6      190 
3  #5  170    #3  140   #4   145 
4  #4  145      #4  145       1/2 (#3+#5)    155   
 




We see that the possibility of randomization for the innovation projects which fall 
into the middle category increases the total value of the projects. The inventions, as in 
the previous case, are determined by randomization, and therefore, comparing the new 




  Optimal choice    The present system     Randomization 
1  #10  300    #6  190   #7   200 
2  #7  200    #7  200   #6   190 
3  #6  190    #3  140   #4   145 
4  #5  170      #4  145       1/2 (#3+#5)    155   
5  #4  145      #5  170       1/3 (#8+#9+#10)   177 
  




In this model, we have assumed that referees can make a distinction  between 
inventions and innovations. It is clear that focal randomization is the preferable 
mechanism. It gives a better result that the regular peer review mechanism that is used 
nowadays. However, this assumption can be sometimes inappropriate, and it is waived 
in the next model.   12
3. The Third Model: The General Case 
In this section, we keep all the assumptions of model 2, except the one which 
claims that referees can make the distinction  between inventions and innovations. 
Moreover, referees differ in their perception about inventions. Some referees, when 
analyzing an invention project, may believe that it is a good idea, and its probability of 
success is high, but others will disagree. 
 
A. Assumptions 
i. We have k projects, from which only h can be funded. 
ii. Projects are no longer divided into two groups from the point of view of the 
referee. Referees are different in their subjective value of time, as well as their degree 
of imagination and possibility of being inventive. 
B. The model 
As in model 1 and 2, the true value of innovations and inventions are respectively:  
 Voi  =  αDi + γB i                  ( 1 )  
 Vvi  =  αDi + γBi  + βλi                    ( 3 )  
 
In fact, we can write that the value of a project,  independently of being an 
invention or an innovation is always equation (3), when for an innovation the value of 
λi  is 0. Therefore we get: 
 
   Vi  = αDi + γBi  + βλi                 ( 8 )  
We order all the projects (inventions and innovations) in an increasing value such 
that 
 V 1  <  Vi ... < Vk   .  
 
The referees try to estimate these values. We denote Uij the value given by referee 
j to the i project. It is, as in the previous model, a function of the time spent analyzing 
the project and the cleverness of it. It is also a function of the referee's opinion on how  
innovative is the project. As stated earlier, no one can really perceive the value of an 
invention, but some referees are more inventive than others, and have better intuition as 
to what the future portends.  We call λj the intuition of scientist j, which is distributed 
normally on the whole range [0, ∝]. The referees, therefore, make two types of errors, 
one on Di and one on λi.  
On the distance, Bi, the error made by referee j is as in model 2: 
 
 
   13
         0      for  Di    ≤  Tj    (9) 
  ∆
oij  =    
  α (Di - Tj)            for Di  > Tj 
 
When considering the inventive element, λi, we assume that (i) the more creative 
the referee, the better he estimates the invention element; (ii) if the referee is more 
creative that the project proposed, he makes no error on the value; and (iii) the error is 
an increasing function of the  difference between the true value and his creative 
possibilities. Therefore: 
 
        0      for  λi  ≤ λj    (10) 
  ∆
vij  =    
       β( λi - λj)     for λi  > λj 
    
We get that the valuation given by a referee is: 
 
              αDi + γBi  + βλi       for Di  ≤ Tj and λi  ≤λj  
    
  Uij  =     αTj  + γBi + βλi           for Di  > Tj and λi  ≤ λj    
 
 (11)     αDi  + γBi  + βλj                       for Di  ≤ Tj and λi  > λj  
    
      αTj  + γBi + βλj                    for Di  > Tj and λi  > λj  
                       
 
C. The mechanism for choosing optimal projects.  
 
We show that the optimal ranking mechanism is to accept projects that all referees 
have ranked at the top (on which the variance between referees is low), and to reject the 
projects that all referees have put  on the bottom (on which the variance between 
referees is low). For those on which referees do not agree on the ranking (the variance 
is high), randomization is optimal. We compare in a numerical example the mechanism 
presently used with the one proposed. 
The same example is used as in the two previous models, but innovations and 
inventions are presented together. As in the first model, k=10,and h=4. We have seven 
innovations, and three inventions, but the referees are unaware of it.  We set: α =10, γ 
=1, β=1; and the Dis, Bis and λis are as in the previous examples and shown in table 4, 




 (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
 
Rank  
















                   
1  4 0   40  40  40  40  40 
2  5  30    80  70 80 80  77 
3  6  0  30  90  60 80 90  77 
4 5  0  80  130  60  80  130  90 
5  7 70   140  110  120  140  123 
6  8 65   145  105  115  145  122 
7 12  50    170  90  100  140  110 
8  3  160    190  190 190 190  190 
9  9  110    200  150 160 200  170 
10 1  0  300  310  30  80  160  90 
               
               
 
 
Let us assume that there are three referees with Tj and λj  that are respectively: (4, 5,9) 
and (20,30,150). Therefore from equation (11), Uij  j=1,2,3 are as presented in column 
(6)-(8). The average of these three referee review is presented in column (9). 
The projects chosen under the different systems are:  
 
 Table 5 
__________________________________________________________________ 
   Optimal choice    The present system     Randomization 
1  #10  310    #9  200   #9    200   
2  #9  200    #8  190   #8    190   
3  #8  190    #6  145   #6    145 
4  #7  170      #5  140          1/3[#5+#7+#10]    207 
 
Total       870            675            742 
       __________________________________________________________________ 
  
As can be shown in table 5, the focal randomization leads to higher average return. 
Randomization allows projects with high returns to be accepted. This does not imply 
that all inventions financed will be successful.  On average, however, inventions have a 
higher return than innovations. This is the key element to the importance of inventions,  
being accepted.   15
IV. Conclusion 
This paper has presented some simple models, although quite closed to reality, in 
which randomization produces the  best solution. Since referees tend to better 
understand projects that are close to existing technology, they may reject inventive 
projects that will yield high return in the future. Peer review leads to conformity, while 
a random choice will permit the funding of inventive projects.  
I would like to underline that focal randomization should not be on the whole set 
of proposed projects, because some of them are valueless  which referees perceive 
immediately. Other projects are very  good, and should be chosen without 
randomization. On the rest of the set of projects, randomization seems to be optimal. 
Therefore it is a focal randomization. First the projects are grouped in three categories, 
and only on the target group of the "unclear" value, randomization is performed. 
Rational scholars feel sometimes uneasy with a randomization mechanism. Why 
should bright scholars throw dice, when it is so clear to them, that they make the right 
choice! Therefore, they do not like to waive the right to choose. 
First, it is important to underline, that scholars keep the power on what we term 
focalization, i.e., the scholars decide which projects enter the group of projects entitled 
to randomization. When all scholars decide unanimously that a specific project is not 
good, it is immediately thrown out, and when all decide that a project is good, it is 
immediately chosen. However, there are many projects on which there are 
disagreements. Focal randomization will not throw these projects but will perform 
randomization on this focal group.   
These models have taken into consideration that the mistakes of the referees are 
due only to lack of information. It could also be that referees choose projects in which 
they are not completely disinterested. They could  act not in the public interest 
exclusively, but might have self interest, and might, for some subjective reason, dislike 
a project. Their report would, therefore, not take  only the public interest into 
consideration. This "public choice" perspective would strengthen the importance of 
introducing randomization, into which no elements of sympathy, approval or power 
enter. Randomization on the  projects where referees disagree not only increases 
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